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Abstract
This article offers a method of reading the courtroom which produces an alternative mapping of 
the space. My method combines a reading of Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty with a Deleuzian 
theoretical analysis. I suggest that this is a useful method since it allows examination of the spatial 
praxes of the courtroom which pulsate with a power to organize, terrorize and to judge. This 
method is also able to conceptualize the presence of ‘‘screaming’’ bodies and living matter which 
are appropriated to build, as well as feed the presence and functioning of the courtroom space, 
or organism. By using a method that articulates the cry of these bodies in the shadow of the 
organism, it becomes clear that this cry is both unwelcome and suppressed by the courtroom. 
The howl of anxious bodies enduring the process and space of the law can be materialized 
through interruptions to the courtroom, such as when bodies stand when they should not and 
when they speak when they should be silent. These vociferous actualizations of the scream serve 
only to feed the organism they seek to disturb, yet if the scream is listened to before it disrupts, 
the interruption becomes-imperceptible to the courtroom. Through my Artaudian/Deleuzian 
reading, I give a voice to the corporeal gasp that lingers before the cry, which is embedded within 
the embodied multiplicity from which it is possible to draw a creative line of flight. The creative 
momentum of this line of flight produces a sustainable interruption to the courtroom process, 
which instead of being consumed by the system, has the potential to produce new courtroom 
alignments. My text therefore offers an alternative reading of the courtroom, and in doing so also 
offers a refined understanding of how to productively ‘‘interrupt’’ the courtroom process.
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 1. Artaud, A., The Theatre and its Double, trans. Corti, V. (Surrey: Alma Classics Ltd., 
2013), p. 65.
 2. See Artaud, The Theatre and its Double, p. 7. He writes: ‘‘Our fossilized idea of theatre is tied 
in with our fossilized idea of a shadowless culture where, whatever way we turn, our minds 
meet with nothing but emptiness while space is full. But true theatre, because it moves and 
makes use of living instruments, goes on stirring up shadows, while life endlessly stumbles 
along.’’ See also Act 4 of this article.
 3. See Artaud, The Theatre and its Double, pp. 63–71.
I. Double Act
In The Theatre and its Double, Antonin Artaud does not attack the concept of theatre as 
a medium of performance; his project was not to eradicate theatre as a medium of artistic 
expression. Rather, it was to interrupt its seemingly rigid and rational discourse, which 
opposes the vitality of the sensory experience of the audience with the discursive nature 
of theatre’s conventions. Artaud envisaged a connective experience that would see the 
senses enveloped by space, which would produce a performance similar to the intensity 
and strangeness of the dream; the sort of dream where concepts become tangible and 
textured, and where it becomes possible to grasp at sounds. In order to do this, he needed 
to create a moment of violence that would be powerful enough to prise apart the rigidity 
of prevailing theatrical devices and narratives which he saw as thoroughly immutable, 
yet also ensure that the creative momentum generated by this moment of violence was 
sustained. For Artaud, the problem with theatre is that it does not provide an enriching 
and sensory experience for the body. For theatre to do this, the creative line of flight must 
burst from the very body and the imagination it oppresses. As Artaud writes, ‘‘The prob-
lem is to turn theatre into a function in the proper sense of the word, something as exactly 
localized as the circulation of our blood through our veins, or the apparently chaotic 
evolution of dream images in the mind …’’1
In conceptualizing this moment of productive violence, Artaud sought not only to 
question the expression of these theatrical conventions, but also to open a space for 
exploration of the potential for sensory experience emerging within these conventions. 
His project was to seek out these ruptures within the rigidity of the structure. He sought 
to expand and explore these spaces and prospect for the richest and most intoxicating 
sensory-material couplings. I read Artaud as a materialist because he engages deeply 
with the spatial and linguistic arrangement of theatre and the capacity of its materiality 
to shape the sensory experience of the actors and the audience, as well as the medium of 
theatre itself.2 Artaud sees theatre as holding the potential to be a space for the unfolding 
of mutual sensory experience. In order to do so, he does not do away entirely with theat-
rical conventions;3 rather, he is anxious to experiment so as to maximize the potential for 
this sensory experience within the performance of theatrical discourse.
It is clear that Artaud identified that by reconnecting the theatre with the body we can 
transform theatre into an experience that is richly sensual. It is also clear that he did not 
consider theatre to be a space created for the body. For these reasons, I have chosen to 
use Artaud’s text The Theatre and its Double to explore how his project could be applied 
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 4. Deleuze, G., The Logic of Sense, trans. Lester, M. and Stivale, C. (London: Continuum, 
2004), p. 103.
 5. Id.
to the courtroom. As I show below, the courtroom can be conceived as a theatrical space, 
as well as a highly oppressive space. The courtroom contains and twists bodies into its 
tiny caverns and grand paneled auditoria, with walls built to ensure the painful silencing 
of already terrorized bodies. Yet, like Artaud, I am not interested in saying that the court-
room should be abandoned altogether as a method of adjudication. Rather, I suggest that 
the courtroom could benefit from being interrupted in the same way that Artaud inter-
rupted theatre.
In order to mobilize this reading of Artaud, I use the works of Deleuze and Guattari 
since they recognize that relations between and with our own bodies take place on a 
number of levels (most notably with, for instance, ‘‘surface organization’’4 or solely with 
depth). Artaud is an explorer entirely of depth, returning experience absolutely to the 
body and detaching it from its experience of surface. My combined reading of Artaud 
and Deleuze is therefore able to accomplish recognition of the depths of the courtroom, 
while also recognizing that the disjunction between depth and surface is not absolute, 
with the eminently interruptible surface remaining. Artaud’s body is that which ema-
nates impassioned howls, it occupies a realm below surface, where it skulks, shouts and 
transfigures itself into the sensible, ‘‘incorporeal frontier’’5 of the organism. I will go on 
to examine the affect of the body on courtroom spatial praxes, and vice versa in the sec-
tions which follow. This will allow situation of the body in-relation-to the courtroom and 
its processory flows and spatial organization. This will be where the interruption begins 
to gather momentum, where it starts to form and threaten to burst from the messy corpo-
real depths.
I will map an image of the courtroom which draws on various literature which exam-
ines this space. I will then interrupt this traditional mapping through application of my 
Deleuzian/Artaudian theoretical method. It is hoped that the reader will gain a sense of 
the performative nature of the interruption, that the reader will sense it gathering momen-
tum through each recognition of the presence and affect of bodies and material, together 
with the potential for these interruptions to produce new courtroom alignments which do 
not oppress and terrorize the body. Finally, I will consider the cumulative affect of this 
interruption, and how the nature of the interruption conceived here differs from a tradi-
tional understanding of an interruption as something which disrupts the process. This 
final section will suggest through the use of a case law example that the traditional ‘‘dis-
ruptive’’ interruption is not capable of delivering the desired jolt to the system; it only 
serves to nourish and feed that which it attempts to change. In summary, my aim here is 
to sketch an image of the courtroom, but also to configure the shifting basis from which 
a productively interrupting line of flight can be drawn.
II. The Double (Act 1: Having done with organs?)
In the traditional old courtrooms, such as the Old Bailey in London, there is strict segre-
gation between the various courtroom participants; there is a line drawn between the 
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 6. Hanson, J., ‘‘The Architecture of Justice: Iconography and space configuration in the English 
law court building,’’ Architectural Research Quarterly, 1(4), 1996, 50–59, 53.
 7. Ibid., at 54.
 8. See Mulcahy, L., Legal Architecture (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p. 14 onwards, for an 
account of the historical development of the courtroom and its function as both a space of 
legal process, as well as a ceremonial institution designed to inspire awe in those which are 
present within the room.
 9. Hanson, ‘‘The Architecture of Justice,’’ 55.
10. See Mulcahy, Legal Architecture, pp. 48–51, often these spaces are designed by architects 
to facilitate the continued segregation of the space – to maintain the exclusivity of the spa-
tial zone and minimize the risk of cross-contamination of bodies. Also see Hanson, ‘‘The 
Architecture of Justice’’ and Act 3 of this article, where these hidden spaces can also become 
productive moments of rupture within the courtroom organism.
11. Mulcahy, Legal Architecture, p. 56.
12. Ibid., at p. 57.
13. See Mulcahy, Legal Architecture, p. 38 onwards. Advocates are separated from their client, 
which seems illogical from a practical point of view, yet it becomes apparent that the bound-
ary is not only spatial, but social and hierarchical. See also p. 59 onwards regarding the spatial 
practice of positioning the defendant within the dock and how this significantly contradicts 
the presumption of innocence.
judge, advocates, defendant and the public gallery and there is a line drawn between 
performers and audience. These barriers are solid partitions, or they are changes in spa-
tial levels.6 The effect is almost mythical and church-like, where all who enter feel the 
‘‘generosity, verticality, exclusivity, grandeur, dignity and awe’’7 of the space and of the 
law. The older courtrooms create an imposing and also terrifying space where the interior 
is dark and wooden, with paneling and pews.8 In the newer courtrooms, such as a local 
crown or county court, the look is slightly softer, with less verticality and grandeur, but 
there still remains strong maintenance of boundaries between the actors (and audience) 
despite the interior having a lighter look.9 In addition to the obvious spaces of the court-
room, such as the judge’s bench, the bar, the dock, the jury box, the public gallery and 
the press box, there are other less-obvious, hidden but crucial spaces. These are spaces 
such as the judge’s private chambers, which sit behind the bench, as well as a network of 
corridors that exist outside of the courtroom itself, but are integral to accessing each area. 
These corridors and alleys are also an essential part of the courtroom process, with many 
legal negotiations and conversations taking place within them.10 The divisions that are 
maintained do not only take place at a surficial level; there is also a depth and excess to 
these spatial divisions. Mulcahy writes that spatial praxes within the courtroom are 
founded on a ‘‘discourse of difference based on gender and class’’11 which is entrenched 
via ‘‘excessive boundary maintenance.’’12 The boundaries that are maintained within the 
courtroom are a violent division between those who are educated and those who are not; 
those who are within the law and those who are outside of it.13 There is a deep quality to 
these spatial praxes: they stretch back through history.
These boundaries, levels and various courtroom actors constitute the structured 
organism of the court, since they are legal singularities, or organs as instruments of 
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14. Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Massumi, B. (London: Continuum, 
2004), p. 177.
15. Hyde, A., Bodies of Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 205.
16. See the Scottish case of Steve Gough, or the ‘‘Naked Rambler.’’ He was charged with various 
public indecency offenses by virtue of taking various naked walks in Scotland. He refused 
to undertake the court process fully clothed and insisted on doing so in the nude. Gough was 
completely removed from the process and not allowed to be present at his own hearing until 
he appeared appropriately clothed (see MacQueen, H.L., Scots Law News Edinburgh Law 
Review, (2004), 149). The courtroom is arguably the most ‘‘clothed’’ space there is, with 
various superfluous adornments such as wigs and robes being necessary in many cases, or 
suits at the very least. In not articulating his body in accordance with the process, Gough was 
incoherent before the process, and forced out of it entirely. This brings into question how ill-
equipped the process is to deal with marginal bodies, or simply different bodily articulation.
the law and are each necessary for the functioning of the courtroom space and the 
process. It is of course possible to draw an analogy with the instruments and singulari-
ties of the theatre: the stage, the stalls, the circle, the bar, the actors, the writers, the 
producers, the directors and the audience. These distinct spatial areas and bodies are 
inextricably tied to the function of law, or the function of theatre, where the zones and 
actors with their discrete roles constitute the organism of the courtroom, or the thea-
tre. They appear to be crucial to the smooth functioning of the organism and the harsh 
segregation between zones perpetuates the myth that it is necessary to remain within 
them. Moving outside of these zones, or acting against the imposed function would be 
contrary to the spirit of the organism. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, ‘‘You will be 
organized, you will be organism, you will articulate your body – otherwise you’re just 
depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted – otherwise 
you’re just a deviant …’’14 It is therefore deviant and depraved to question the fabric 
of the organism and to question, or interrupt it, is to put yourself outside of it. It is an 
act of making yourself incomprehensible before the organism and to refuse to be part 
of it; you must articulate your body in a manner which conforms to and nourishes the 
organism. In the case of the courtroom, your movement must be slow and vertical, 
you must not show any emotion and you must not make any sounds apart from sub-
missions or the giving of evidence. The space and the correct articulation of bodies is 
essential to the process of the court hearing and to disrupt its functioning, is to disrupt 
the law. Hyde writes that marginalized and disfavored bodies are perceived by the law 
as threats to social order, a perception which originates in law’s inclination to accept 
generalized identities.15 This is explicitly played out in the courtroom through exam-
ples such as the case of the ‘‘Naked Rambler,’’ where the body is displayed in its full 
odorous glory in the course of the defendant’s articulation of his marginalized iden-
tity.16 But why would anyone want to disrupt the functioning of the courtroom and 
why try to interrupt it so violently, since it is clear that such cries tend to strengthen 
the will of the law to restore order? It seems there is a perceived rigidity to the court-
room space and process which can only be disrupted or changed through such extreme 
activism, yet this is not entirely so.
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17. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 167.
18. Manning, E., ‘‘Always More than One: The Collectivity of A Life,’’ Body and Society, 16(1), 
117–27, 121.
19. Manning ‘‘Always More than One,’’ 121.
20. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 166.
–Interruption (re-arrange?)
While the courtroom (and the theatre) can be seen as an organism, that is, it is an organ-
ized structure built of spatial zones and particular entities; this is not the extent of its 
body. Rather, the body is constituted of strata, of always immanent layers. This means 
that while an aspect of the courtroom can be characterized as an organism comprising 
forcibly obedient bodies, it also holds within it the power to overcome its own organiza-
tion. The means by which it can do this is by ascending its ‘‘Body without Organs’’ 
(BwO). The BwO can be seen as immanent potential to overcome organization, but it is 
not separate to organization, rather, it is the potential to disrupt itself from within itself. 
The BwO is a vast pool of potential movements and affects, which means it necessarily 
departs from organization. It is predominantly a moment of questioning whether it is 
possible to do something other than be organized in a particular way, and simply asks the 
following,
Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, breathing with your 
lungs, swallowing with your mouth, talking with your tongue, thinking with your brain, having 
an anus and larynx, head and legs? Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see 
through your skin, breathe with your belly: the simple thing, the Entity, the full body …17
In transcending the actual and ascending the BwO, the organism must be dismantled, or 
at least questioned. In seeking to actualize the potentials of the BwO, the whole body can 
reach towards its alternative formulations, albeit it will never be fully actualized, as 
Manning writes, ‘‘The body never fully actualizes. Or better said, the actual is never fully 
actual.’’18 It is clear that the BwO must be thought of as the infinite range of bodily pos-
sibilities, but it is not a case of the organized body reaching towards potential, rather, the 
organized body must be thought of as immanent to the BwO, as Deleuze writes: ‘‘The 
actual is the complement or the product, the object actualization, which has nothing but 
the virtual as its subject. Actualization belongs to the virtual.’’19 It is therefore a question 
of realizing that the organs can do other things and that they have potential to be actual-
ized in different ways – you can declare war on them.
This experimentation is what Artaud had in mind for his Theatre of Cruelty. As 
Deleuze and Guattari note in one of their references to Artaud’s work: ‘‘On November 
28, 1947, Artaud declares war on the organs: To be done with the Judgment of God, ‘for 
you can tie me up if you wish, but there is nothing more useless than an organ.’’’20 On 
first reading, it initially appears that Deleuze and Guattari are suggesting that Artaud is 
saying that the organ itself is useless, but this is not the case. Artaud is not suggesting that 
the singularity of the organ itself is useless. Rather, it is deprived of its own vitality when 
it is subsumed within the organism, or when its potential is forced to actualization in 
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21. Artaud, The Theatre and its Double, p. 62.
22. Ibid., at p. 72.
23. Mulcahy, Legal Architecture, p. 34.
24. The crest is instantly recognizable as the law’s signifier, but also of law as perhaps an instru-
ment of God. The phrase that is beneath the crest is in French. It most translates in English 
to ‘‘God and my right.’’ This does not hold any obvious meaning for those who use the court 
process and almost amounts to a presence that speaks to us in a language we do not under-
stand from behind the judge’s chair.
25. This brief description summarizes the spatial composition of a typical old-style criminal 
courtroom (see Mulcahy, Legal Architecture, for a more detailed description and also dia-
grammatic representations of the space). Spatial practices in civil courtrooms differ, but there 
remains the same degree of separation and boundary maintenance.
accordance with representation. For Artaud, it is more a question of liberating the organ 
from the organism and the network of organization that can return an organ to itself: 
‘‘Hence this full-scale invocation of cruelty and terror, its scope testing our entire vitality, 
confronting us with our potential.’’21 The ‘‘cruelness’’ of the Theatre of Cruelty is a way 
of testing the organs and of experimenting with them and their connected spaces. Artaud 
therefore does not take the word cruelty as meaning something ‘‘sadistic or bloody.’’22 It 
is not meant in the true sense of the word, or as an act calculated to cause physical or 
psychological harm, rather, the word is used to describe the kind of violence that is nec-
essary to disrupt the organism and its accustomed functioning. It is more a method of 
radical destabilization which gives the organism the power to dismantle itself through 
doubting and questioning its use, or allowing a different range of potentials to be actual-
ized. It is therefore clear that the body of the courtroom organism does not have to remain 
in any fixed formulation, indeed it must change, since its body bursts with an inherent 
potential to do so. While it can be argued that courtroom design progresses and improves 
over time,23 it is the basis that unfolds into changes in spatial praxes that must be further 
examined, and as will be argued in the following section, interrupted.
III. The Double (Act 2: Theatre of Power)
The courtroom is a theatre of power and ritual. The spatial arrangement is one of vertical-
ity, with an order of descending power. God is at the back of the courtroom, at the top, 
behind the ornate crest which proclaims ‘‘dieu et mon droit.’’24 The judge is in front of 
the crest, judging from on high and in front of him are the advocates, who stand to deliver 
their submissions. At the back of the room, in the dock, is the defendant and to the right 
of him, is the jury, contained in their box. To the left is a very small space for the public 
to observe the court process.25 As I have already said, this arrangement has its founda-
tions in social ordering and maintenance of organization for the purpose of the smooth 
functioning of the courtroom organism. However, this arrangement is also an assemblage 
as it is constructed of symbols, objects, positions and bodies. Yet the courtroom assem-
blage is the very antithesis to what Artaud had in mind in his Theatre of Cruelty. The 
courtroom as a performance of law is rigid in its use of conventions and if these conven-
tions are not used and performed, then the performance of the trial founders and the law 
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26. Deleuze, G., Essays, Critical and Clinical (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 
p. 131.
27. Artaud, The Theatre and its Double, p. 62.
28. Deleuze, G., Two Regimes of Madness, trans. Hodges, A. and Taormina, M. (New York: 
Semiotext(e), 2006), p. 177.
founders: law is the user of conventions par excellence. In order to facilitate the deliver-
ance of judgment, the legal body must use a language of caselaw, statutes and legal 
books, which must be read by organs such as lawyers, bailiffs, jurors and drafters, and 
the case must be heard in the space of the courtroom. This being said, it does not mean 
that the fabric of organization, or the courtroom assemblage, does not hold potential 
within it for a radical paradigm shift; for it too can become a Theatre of Cruelty through 
a Deleuzian conception of the ‘‘second’’ body of law,
… two bodies coexist, each of which reacts upon and enters into the other: a body of 
judgment, with its organization, its segments (continuity of offices) its differentiations 
(bailiffs, lawyers, judges …), its hierarchies (classes of judges, or bureaucrats); but also a 
body of justice in which the segments are dissolved, the differentiations lost, the hierarchies 
thrown into confusion, a body which retains nothing but intensities that make up uncertain 
zones that traverse these zones at full speed and confront the powers in them … on this 
anarchic body restored to itself.26
Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty provides a way in which it is possible to access this imma-
nent potential to rearrange and also confront and confuse the dynamic of power. Artaud’s 
vision can be conceived of as a surreal proposal for an eccentric form of dream-like thea-
tre, that is, it concocts a distorted version of theatre, which mixes the traditional format 
with more than its fair share of the fantastic. Artaud’s project was to form new and bewil-
dering mixtures which would comprise the audience and the traditional dramatic devices, 
which would be opened up and explored, and their vitality returned. He sought not only 
to create new ways of initiating theatrical performance, but also to radically rearrange the 
accepted arrangement of theatre. This new arrangement would draw out new and pro-
found sensory connections between all of the bodies involved in the process, as Artaud 
writes, ‘‘Thus on the one hand we have the magnitude and scale of a show aimed at the 
whole anatomy, and on the other an intensive mustering of objects, gestures and signs 
used in a new spirit.’’27 Artaud conceives of a new way of sensing through rearrange-
ment, or accessing the potential within the theatre’s BwO.
Artaud also accesses a bodily potential which can be actualized through a Deleuzian 
assemblage. For Deleuze, in assemblages you find: ‘‘states of things, bodies, various com-
binations of bodies, hodgepodges; but you also find utterances, modes of expression, and 
whole regimes of signs.’’28 So an assemblage can be a mixture of an infinite array of bod-
ies and things, and these mixtures are always with signs. There is never an assemblage 
that comprises one but not the other. Thus, Artaud’s proposal is for an assemblage of both 
the traditional ‘‘signs’’ of theatre, such as the stage, the audience, costume, and the play 
itself, but also recognition that there are material elements. But from where can the 
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29. Ibid., at p. 179.
30. Blackman, L., Immaterial Bodies (London: Sage, 2012), p. 1.
31. Discomfort in the courtroom can be experienced on a physical level, through the restrictions 
on movement and expression, the hardness of courtroom seating, the coldness of the room. It 
can also be felt emotionally, especially as a victim or defendant who must endure the physical 
discomfort as well as the trauma induced by the process itself.
momentum that generates rearrangements arise, or rather, how is it possible to access this 
moment of realignment in an organism that is so rigid, and apparently un-interruptible 
such as the courtroom?
I have said that an assemblage is a collection of bodies which are heterogeneous in 
nature, that is, it can be collections of bodies, objects and signs, which seem to move 
together. But what is it that connects these elements of an assemblage? Deleuze goes on 
to consider how the elements of an assemblage interact: ‘‘first and foremost what keeps 
very heterogeneous elements together: e.g. a sound, a gesture, a position, etc., both natu-
ral and artificial elements.’’29 What connects an assemblage is therefore the assemblage 
itself. It is the materiality of the connection between the elements, or the consistency of 
the connection. The consistency is the content of the mixture between each element 
when the particles of the constituents congeal. It is sounds, gestures, positions, texture, 
movement and so on. These are simultaneously the material consequences of the interac-
tion of the elements, that which connects them and that which form the dynamic of the 
assemblage itself. These movements and sounds that are generated can also be conceived 
of as affects. The elements that constitute an assemblage are bound, but also separated 
and propelled in their movement through affectations generated by their presence; any 
given element exists as part of an assemblage compiled of human and non-human 
processes.30
Within the courtroom, each part of the space throbs with the affect of power. The 
wood that is shaped into panels that form its walls becomes wood of power, the barriers 
between the separate zones of the space are barriers to maintain the hierarchy of power, 
and the bodies that enter the courtroom, such as the barristers, judges, the defendant 
and the public, form an assemblage with elements of the space. The consistency of the 
connection between these bodies and the space itself take on a specific quality. The 
position of these bodies is within the allocated zones and bodies stringently follow 
the hierarchical order of the space, which demonstrates a connection of power to the 
spatial zones and produces movements which attune to this pattern. Movement is on a 
slow trajectory and solely vertical plane: the court rises, the court sits. Gestures are 
completely absent from the courtroom, hands must be kept by your side. The sounds 
these bodies make are not groans and screams, but articulations only through law’s 
language: statutes, cases and courtroom etiquette. You may only speak if it is your turn 
and if you are citing supporting authority. The affect that maintains this assemblage is 
not sensual or comfortable, but one of power. This affect that is produced by the court-
room is one that restricts bodies, while also allowing a sense of recognition, that is, 
bodies are almost comforted by the fact that they are in the presence of the law, while 
paradoxically experiencing profound discomfort.31 This legally appropriated affect is 
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32. Blackman, Immaterial Bodies, p. 16.
33. Artaud, The Theatre and its Double, p. 62.
34. Ibid., at p. 60.
35. Ibid., at p. 64.
36. Ibid., at p. 66.
37. Manning, ‘‘Always More than One,’’ 122.
one that is compelled towards and maintains the subjectivities inscribed on bodies that 
experience the room, and in this sense, it is an experience of subjectivity, rather than 
experience of true affect. While movement, sound and gestures can be conceived of as 
affects, it can be argued that affects do not require a subject in order to materialize.32 
This conception of affect as impersonal is important since it creates a space for inter-
ruption, or a way of identifying the moment from which the embodied rearrangement 
that Artaud calls for might flow.
–Interruption (affects)
Artaud considered the Theatre of Cruelty as the necessary means by which the body can 
regain its sensory capability – repeated jading of our organs calls for sudden shocks.33 
Artaud wanted the audience, the performers, directors and so on to be completely 
immersed in the sensory milieu of the theatre. He wanted the theatre to cease to be per-
sonal, and instead be capable of assimilating the transformative power of affect. He 
wanted theatre to fully appeal to the sensory vitality of bodies, as Artaud writes, ‘‘Infused 
with the idea that the masses think with their senses first … The Theatre of Cruelty pro-
poses to resort to mass theatre, thereby rediscovering a little of the poetry in the ferment 
of great agitated crowds hurled against one another, sensations only too rare nowadays 
…’’34 In order to achieve this ‘‘great sensation’’ he proposed something quite alien to the 
courtroom’s theatre of power. He sought a sensory alliance between the human partici-
pants, the space and its excess as well as its objects. He had in mind a kind of metaphys-
ics that would drive every element of the assemblage, creating a ‘‘thrilling equation 
between Man, Society, Nature and Objects.’’35 His proposal was a de-actualization of 
subjectivity, a complete exposure to the potentially impersonal power of affect where 
‘‘every show would contain physical, objective elements perceptible to all.’’36 The power 
of affect, which can be thought of as consistency in binding and separating, through 
Artaud also becomes profoundly transformative.
This transformative power is in line with a conception of affect as a possible range of 
experience and sensual responses, as Manning writes: ‘‘Affect … erupts in bursts, 
expressing itself through dephasings that produce not discrete parts but new processes 
…’’37 Artaud’s vision is open to the true disruptive power of affect, that is, affect that 
produces new arrangements, where the process itself is less concerned with the affirma-
tion of subjectivities. Having identified the point where the productive disruption might 
occur within the courtroom (that is, everywhere) how would the space look if the trajec-
tory of this disruption is followed; how can the space be rearranged as a result if we fol-
low this interruption?
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38. This is something I have personally experienced through ‘‘marshaling’’ in July 2011 at 
Blackfriars Crown Court. This is a period of a week spent with a Judge, where I accompanied 
him throughout the day, both beside him on the bench in court, and in his chambers.
39. This is experience I have gained through working in law firms as a case-worker and advocate 
from 2003–2009, as well as various shadowing placements with barristers from 2009–2011.
40. See modern courtroom arrangements discussed by Hanson, ‘‘The Architecture of Justice’’ and 
Mulcahy, Legal Architecture. In addition, although not considered in this article, alternative 
spatial practices are present within spaces used for mediation and arbitration. These processes 
are a less formal way of resolving disputes, yet they are still within the judicial/legal system. 
They could also be an interesting avenue of exploration in reforming spatial practices. This is 
because the process itself is generally considered to be more relaxed in nature, which means 
the spatial practices are constructed around a less formal process. This also alludes to a further 
rupture within the system itself.
IV. The Double (Act 3: Revolving Rooms)
As I mentioned previously, the courtroom is a space of wooden panels, vertiginous spatial 
levels and imposing grandeur. This is the kind of space that occupies the mainstream 
imaginary and represents the recognizable surface of the courtroom. What does not come 
to mind however, are the hidden depths of the space which I refer to here in two separate 
ways. First, I have in mind the judge’s chambers, which extend back from the judges chair 
on the bench. Behind the bench is often a network of corridors which house each judge’s 
private office and chambers. It also comprises a large room with a large dining table, 
around which the judges will sit together and share lunch, discuss cases and make arrange-
ments for their weekend.38 I also have in mind the vast networks of corridors that connect 
each of the separate spatial zones in the courtroom space, as well as the corridors between 
each courtroom within the building. The corridors often contain seating and are the place 
where barristers, solicitors and clients will discuss cases, and where the claimant and the 
defendant might talk (or fight). There are also cafeterias (for advocates only), robing 
rooms (for male/female advocates) and cells (where solicitors and advocates are permitted 
to visit their client if he is being held in custody). These are the additional spaces of the 
courtroom, the hidden depths and the unfolding space of the courtroom. They are present 
within the process and therefore within the room, but also hidden from view.
Second, I refer to different types of courtroom. I have had the opportunity of experi-
encing many of them, such as Greater London magistrates’ courts, crown courts in the 
center of London, the Old Bailey, The Royal Courts of Justice, as well as county courts 
all over the country.39 Each and every one is different, but of particular interest here, is 
the kind of modern courtroom that Hansen identifies, which are different since when you 
enter them, you would not recognize them as courtrooms. There could be just a similarly 
segregated space but with a lighter seeming interior, or there could be something entirely 
different – just a table around which the judge, the advocates and their clients sit and deal 
with the case.40 This is also a ‘‘hidden’’ courtroom, since it is largely absent from court-
room discourse, but also present as a space of adjudication for many court users. In this 
section, I will be using these two angles to consider how the courtroom might be able to 
utilize and surface these depths in order to construct a more sensory courtroom.
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Artaud was critical of spatial conventions and divisions, preferring instead to experi-
ment with the space in order to create diverse sensory experiences. His project was to 
encourage experience of space itself and to expose the audience to the productive, stimu-
lating and intoxicating qualities of space. His first step was to remove the boundaries 
between the stage and the auditorium, ‘‘we intend to do away with stage and auditorium, 
replacing them with a kind of single, undivided locale without any partitions of any kind 
and this will become the very scene of the action.’’41 In doing so, he has in mind a col-
lapsing of not only the spatial divisions, but also of re-establishing a connection between 
the audience and the actors. He goes on to write that, ‘‘Direct contact will be established 
between the audience and the show, between actors and audience …’’42 Artaud is acutely 
aware of the affect that spatial boundaries have in dividing bodies, and how this division 
can impede upon the genuinely sensory experience of other bodies and the show itself. 
He also brings to our attention that space has the power to either maintain this separation 
between bodies, or to open potential for different ways of experiencing the theatrical 
process. Artaud almost submits entirely to space and its ability to shape the unfolding of 
his Theatre of Cruelty. There is a kind of abandon that comes through in his text which 
is indicative of a profound appreciation of the productive qualities of space, ‘‘the very 
fact that the audience is seated in the centre of the action, is encircled and furrowed by it. 
This encirclement comes from the shape of the house itself.’’43 Artaud’s space is a space 
of unfolding, but it is a space that unfolds the action through its own productive capacity. 
The challenge for courtroom spatial praxes is therefore to recognize the affect the space 
has on the bodies that must use it, in the same way that Artaud was able.
For Deleuze and Guattari, one modality of understanding space is through its dual 
components: ‘‘smooth and striated.’’ Smooth and striated are distinct forms of space, yet 
they exist together, and so are not to be considered a dualism: ‘‘smooth space is con-
stantly being translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly 
being reversed, returned to a smooth space.’’44 Yet there is a subtle distinction between 
the two, as Deleuze and Guattari go on to explain: ‘‘in striated space, lines or trajectories 
are subordinated to points: one goes from one point to another. In the smooth, it is the 
opposite: the points are subordinated to the trajectory.’’45 There is a kind of cycle with 
space and it is possible to draw an analogy with the theatre at this point. The striated can 
be seen as the spatial conventions: the stage, the auditorium, the bar and the entrance hall 
and it is not just the spatial zones themselves that can be conceived as striated, but also 
the divisions that are necessary to maintain the zones. That is not to say there are not 
smooth elements within the traditional formulation of theatre – it is just that they are 
subsumed within the striated in a particular way.
The most effective way to understand the mixture in this context is through Deleuze 
and Guattari’s application of smooth and striated to sensory experiences of space. 
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Deleuze and Guattari explain that striated space is: ‘‘a more optical space – although the 
eye in turn is not the only organ to have this capacity.’’46 Striated space can be seen as the 
obvious and surface dimensions of space, that is, space without its depths, or potential 
for unfolding. It is directly perceptible space, not only the obviously visual aspects, but 
also obvious perception through other sensory organs. It is the sight of the stage and 
auditorium and acknowledgement of the boundaries. It is also the sound of the accepted 
linguistic conventions (and moments of silence)47 as well as the seats within the audito-
rium which you must sit on, and the expected taste of champagne in the theatre bar. Yet 
it remains possible to situate an interruption within the striated/smooth cycle of space, 
since it remains intact and potentially disruptive prior to the incorporeal frontier of the 
striated.
–Interruption (smooth spaces)
Striated perceptions of the space are not without their smoothness, ‘‘Smooth is both the 
object of a close vision par excellence and an element of haptic space (which may be as 
much visual or auditory as tactile).’’48 The smoothness is therefore the sensory excess; it 
is the softness and rough texture of the seats, the square smoothness of your ticket, the 
cold touch of your champagne glass and the bubbles that tickle the back of your throat. 
It is the hardness of the wooden paneled walls in the courtroom, the transparent coldness 
of the glass that prevents the defendant’s movement outside of the dock, and the steeli-
ness of his cuffs. Artaud’s project was to situate his form of theatre within a sensory and 
smooth terrain, he wanted to harness the productivity of the smooth and allow it to shape 
the performance, ‘‘we advocate a revolving show, which, instead of making stage and 
auditorium two closed worlds without any possible communication between them, will 
extend its visual and oral outbursts over the whole mass of spectators.’’49 He sought to 
open the channels of striation and allow the channels themselves to be shaped through 
sensory experience and through dissolution of spatial boundaries. But he also sought to 
‘‘free up’’ space so it could shape the show for itself, ‘‘spatial, thundering images replete 
with sound also speak.’’50 Artaud’s usage of space is symptomatic of his appreciation of 
the power of smooth space as a space of affect, since he attempts to extract the affective 
properties of space and allow them to hold a greater power than the conventions and 
divisive practices that traditionally mold it.
The properties that Artaud sought to extract are precisely those which derive from 
smooth space, since the smooth is ‘‘occupied by intensities, wind and noise, forces, and 
sonorous and tactile qualities, as in the desert, steppe, or ice. The creaking of ice and the 
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song of the sands.’’51 These ‘‘properties’’ must also be thought of as affects, in the sense 
that occupation of smooth space forces attunement to the physical properties of space, as 
opposed to the measured observation that striated space induces. Henriques identifies 
this very connection, where he argues that the hapticity of space is experienced only 
through affect:
affect is expressed rhythmically – through relationships, reciprocations, resonances, 
syncopations and harmonies. Affect is transmitted in the way wave dynamics are propagated 
through a particular medium – which may be corporeal, or material, or sociocultural.52
It is therefore clear that in order to experience the potentially sensual affects of space, 
bodies must be attuned to these affects, that is, these bodies must be able to listen (both 
to the space and to other bodies). In the context of the courtroom, the ability to listen, to 
be open, is inhibited by the will of the law to assert subjectivities and construct an 
encounter with the law that establishes its power. Yet there are spaces that are connected 
with the courtroom and present within it that have the potential to allow for this produc-
tive attunement. Through this Artaudian/Deleuzian lens, it is possible to conceive of the 
smooth spaces of the courtroom as generative of interruptions, since although they are 
already present and immanent to the organism, smooth space ‘‘possesses a greater power 
of deterritorialization than the striated.’’53
Although Artaud might characterize the space of the courtroom as a space of surface, 
it is clear that it also extends into depth, there is only one surface to the room; this surface 
of depth. The courtroom necessitates a regimented and regulated performance, as there 
is a prescribed order in which each party can speak and from where they can speak. 
Movement is also restricted in this way as each actor within the court cannot move out-
side of their zone, once they are in it and the process has begun. The texture of this expe-
rience is striated, as the courtroom itself is only the surface of perception. Yet the space 
does unfold through hidden rooms and passages that are inextricably connected to the 
courtroom itself. The judge might have discussed a case with his colleagues in the lunch 
room, which might influence his decision or the way he conducts the court process. 
Similarly, the advocates will have discussed a case with their client in the private inter-
view rooms available in the court building. They will also have discussed the case with 
opposing counsel in the corridors that surround the courtroom. The jury will also carry 
out their deliberations in a small room outside of the main courtroom, which will funda-
mentally influence the outcome of the case. The courtroom appears as a representative 
space, which is problematic, as Harris suggests, it ‘‘remains caught in the problem of 
representation – it represents rather than embodies the texture of … smooth space.’’54 Yet 
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the smooth elements of the space are not missing, but rather they are occupied, appropri-
ated by the ‘‘diabolical powers of organization.’’55 The space of the courtroom makes 
explicit the Deleuzian continuum and productive tension of the cycle of space. Whereas 
Artaud would return the space to the body, it is clear that this must be in recognition that 
there is an act of surfacing to follow. The challenge for courtroom design is therefore 
whether it can follow the trajectory of the interruptions that emanate from the corporeal 
depths of the surface.
As I mentioned previously, some of the recently built county courts have a space that 
is all on one level,56 with some courtrooms using a kind of ‘‘roundtable’’ arrangement. 
Harbinger writes that, ‘‘A new courtroom is not beyond imagining’’57 and proposes a 
new literally theatrical court. His proposal does not quite reach the same sensory depths 
as Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty, nonetheless, his proposal is an intriguing one, with his 
entire (and often bizarre) proposal being based on a circular model. He begins by saying 
that the circle is a perfect arrangement as each and every person is near to each other, 
because it is symmetrical and because there are no ‘‘irrelevant corners.’’58 He is of the 
opinion that the traditional spatial arrangement of the courtroom tends to separate and 
has the effect of segregation, when the real aim is for all the participants within the pro-
cess to act as one body, and even proposes that the jury should be seated around a table 
while in the courtroom.59 Yet some of Harbinger’s suggestions may be too much, even 
for Artaud. He suggests that the jury’s area should be at the mercy of a turntable, which 
is exercisable by the judge at the push of a button, should he wish them to not hear the 
proceedings.60 This is convenient of course, but may depart from Artaud’s project of 
inclusivity and the dissolution of hierarchical boundaries. The main point that arises in 
respect to Harbinger’s text is that a circular basis for courtroom spatial praxes might have 
the effect of breaking the barriers between the component parts of the organism, which 
is a point that some modern court architects may have tried to realize in contemporary 
court design.61 This approach to the spatial design of the room produces a creative line of 
flight, one which is able to generate ways of reformulating the space in ways which are 
attentive to the affects of space. The surface of the space reaches far deeper than just the 
spatial design and extends into the physical properties of the space. The surface incorpo-
rates matter which is also organized, but as I will show, can also interrupt.
V. The Double (Act 4: Screens of Matter)
I have mentioned previously that the courtroom enfolds a hidden depth to its space, since 
the divisions and actor-specific zones are in part a product of social devices, such as 
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social hierarchical orderings and gender/class divides.62 There is also a desire to assert 
the authority of law through the creation of a spectacle of justice as well as a perceived 
need to contain a volatile public.63 These social and state forces have influenced the spa-
tial practices utilized by the courtroom, but not only do these forces feed into spatial 
practices which determine the construction and divisions within the room itself, they also 
contribute to the formation of courtroom objects as elements of the space which produce 
the affects of power mentioned above. If these forces were instead replaced by the desire 
to create a Theatre of Cruelty as opposed to a theatre of power, the experience would 
have the potential to become a more radically sensory experience, as well as more wel-
coming to court users. If the courtroom architect designs the space in full recognition of 
the formative power that bursts from matter, together with a commensurate desire to 
allow her practice to be shaped by the underlying sensibility of matter, there becomes a 
creative materiality; or a genuine Deleuzian agencement, as Bennett describes:
Instead of a formative power detachable from matter, artisans (and mechanics, cooks, builders, 
cleaners, and anyone else intimate with things) encounter a creative materiality with incipient 
tendencies and propensities, which are variably enacted depending on other forces, affects, or 
bodies with which they come into close contact.64
Whether the courtroom is designed in the spirit of this ‘‘creative materiality’’ is doubtful. 
To comprehensively and persuasively answer this question would require consideration 
of complex and detailed ontological arguments which I cannot add to here, but what is 
clear is that recognition of the formative power of matter on the space of the courtroom 
becomes increasingly more important as it becomes increasingly evident.
Matter is of course that which forms the space, but it is far from a quiet, merely 
manipulated presence. It has come to profoundly influence both the organization of the 
space, as well as courtroom processes. Through modern court practices such as the use 
of video links, conference call facilities and also screens to maintain divisions between 
vulnerable witnesses and defendants, matter has increasingly become an accepted pres-
ence. Not only is it an accepted presence, but it can be seen as explicitly shaping both 
spatial practices and the court process itself. De Sario writes that the increasing use of 
technology has fundamentally affected the evidence process.65 It has even changed the 
outcome of cases, as lawyers who successfully wield devices such as PowerPoint in their 
presentation of evidence are more likely to encounter a more responsive and ultimately 
swayable jury.66 What must be noted here is that De Sario writes regarding American 
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courtrooms and it seems from her study that the courtroom (at least in her geographical 
area of practice) is much more ready to accept the invasion of technological matter. It is 
also evident from her work that such a presence tends to improve the sensory experience 
of those involved in the court process.67 It seems that there is something that emerges in 
the growing invasion of technological matter that follows the creative trajectory of 
Artaud’s vision of theatre, which also tends to alleviate the suffering of certain bodies. 
Mulcahy notes this in relation to video links:
… the giving of evidence by live link seriously disrupts traditional notions of the trial, but it 
could be argued that there is general merit in disrupting the traditional space-place dynamic in 
adversarial systems. Perhaps the mundane is preferable to the fear-inducing courtroom and 
more likely to reflect contemporary aspirations to ‘‘accessible’’ justice.68
What Mulcahy has identified here is important to this text. The acceptance of matter 
within the courtroom is unavoidable, as well as crucial if courtrooms are to become less 
threatening spaces. Yet the argument is more complex than this, since with the accept-
ance of the invasion of matter comes disruptions to the process which change it funda-
mentally from within. In accordance with material momentum and confederacy, screens 
of matter are added and erected between vulnerable witnesses and defendants and evi-
dence can be given by video link if a witness is too scared or young to be present in court. 
Yet since the basic process of the trial remains unchanged, problematic perceptions are 
produced as a result of this misalignment between the process and material. If a witness 
appears to be too scared that she cannot even look the defendant in the eye, this will 
influence our perceptions of the defendant’s nature and credibility; not only this, but it 
becomes clear that the presumption of innocence is not spatially (nor materially) 
emplaced.69 It is at this point that the notion of the interruption becomes
–Interruption (the imperceptible)
more important than ever. The reader will recall that Artaud’s project is a profoundly 
sensory one, as well as material, and he believed that objects are as important as lan-
guage in shaping the experience of the performance. Artaud writes, ‘‘Puppets, huge 
masks, objects of strange proportions appear by the same right as verbal imagery.’’70 He 
also wanted to liberate matter, and allow it to make its own connection with the audience; 
he wanted the audience to use their senses to experience objects, as opposed to experi-
encing only their surface: ‘‘all objects requiring stereotyped physical representation will 
be discarded or disguised.’’71 Artaud was able to see the material vitality in every ele-
ment of the performance, including lighting, he writes: ‘‘The particular action of light on 
the mind comes into play, we must discover oscillating light effects, new ways of 
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diffusing lighting in waves, sheet lighting like a flight of fire arrows.’’72 His project was 
to encourage genuinely sensory perception of every element of the performance, that is, 
it must be an experience of the space, and everything that builds it, but there is more at 
stake here than just a more sensual experience. What Artaud was able to recognize was 
that human experience is not only through human processes, but one that is profoundly 
influenced by non-human elements; his project proposes an interruption, and as I will 
suggest, a becoming-imperceptible.
Having said earlier that matter is far from an imperceptible presence, it remains so in 
the sense that it escapes us unnoticed, until it is present in the Artaudian sense. But to 
radically make sensible the matter of the process of the courtroom in the manner that 
Artaud suggests, is a little too much and a little too radical for the courtroom. In trying to 
be so far below the surface in the corporeal, material depths, Artaud occupies the line that 
is the threshold, being perceived: he is too loud. Instead, the interruption must be imper-
ceptible, a power which is already within the matter to which Artaud seeks to give a 
voice. While it would seem counter-intuitive in this context to argue for material imper-
ceptibility, this is precisely where the movement occurs, as Deleuze and Guattari explain, 
‘‘Everything becomes imperceptible, everything is becoming-imperceptible on the plane 
of consistency, which is nevertheless precisely where the imperceptible is heard.’’73 
Simply put, when the Artaudian bodies scream, they are perceived since they are so loud. 
Yet this does not help since they are straight-away silenced; instead, the art is to allow the 
gasp to materialize, but to avert the ‘‘eagle’s eye.’’74 The potential movement and rear-
rangements as a result are within this gasp waiting to burst; this perceptible impercepti-
ble gasp is just like movement, which cannot be perceived.75
This is the value of the ‘‘material’’ interruption. We did not notice matter creeping up 
on us, it became part of the process as we did not see it there, as it was always there, as 
part of us. It was (and is) imperceptible, yet it moves and materializes. Authors such as 
Braidotti encourage us to recognize that we can no longer think of ourselves as exclu-
sively human, she writes, ‘‘Not all of us can say, with any degree of certainty, that we 
have always been human, or that we are only that.’’76 It follows that the courtroom is 
experienced by bodies as abstract machines,77 that is, the self must be conceived of as 
permeable, as primordially receptive to its environment, or rather, as part of it. The expe-
rience of the courtroom is felt inside the body of the human, but also brought about by 
matter that it encounters, that is, the experience of the space is a complex web of affec-
tive exchanges. It is not that human bodies that are within the courtroom itself are simply 
blank canvasses that lay open to be affected by matter, nor is it the case that matter is 
simply a terrain to be manipulated by human bodies.78 Matter has interrupted the process 
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successfully; just as Mulcahy has identified.79 While matter screams and gurgles and 
effervesces on the threshold of perception, we do not necessarily hear it (since it is part 
of us). Its movement eludes us, yet it has interrupted us, and we are left with no choice 
but to rethink processes within the courtroom as materially embedded.
–Interruption that interrupts
And so now it has come, the interruption that it is not possible to see, the (until now) 
imperceptible gasp, with movement always immanent, which must be thought of as 
rooted within bodies that scream, matter that buzzes with potential and affects that arise. 
The interruptions I have set out have been subtle; it could be argued that they are simply 
presences around which the courtroom might be re-organized. There has been no vocif-
erous interruption, one which calls the process to a halt to allow a moment of reflection; 
no one has crossed a spatial boundary, spoken when they are not supposed to, nor articu-
lated their body in a way that offends the organism. At this point it therefore becomes 
necessary to reflect on the act of interrupting and contrast an imperceptible or sustainable 
interruption with traditional courtroom interruptions. In order to assist in this reflection, 
I recount here a brief summary of a case so troubled by interruptions that it became a case 
solely about interruptions; the US case of the ‘‘Chicago Seven.’’
Against the background of the 1968 ‘‘Festival of Life’’ which was largely a protest 
against the Vietnam War aimed towards the Democratic National Convention, delegates 
of which were arriving in Chicago, David Dellinger and seven others80 were indicted for 
public order offenses.81 This case, presided over by Judge Julius Hoffman, was inter-
rupted by 159 occasions of criminal contempt, which ‘‘ranged from minor acts of disre-
spect (such as not standing for the judge) to playful acts (such as baring rib cages or 
blowing kisses to the jury) to insulting or questioning the integrity of the court (‘liar,’ 
‘hypocrite,’ and ‘fascist dog’).’’82 Other acts included eating in court, making faces, 
reading newspapers, sleeping in court and generally making a mess of the defense area 
by leaving food wrappers lying around, and even a package of marijuana.83 At one stage, 
one of the defendants, Bobby Seale, outraged the Judge to the extent that he ordered 
Seale to be bound and gagged, and eventually, removed from the case altogether. When 
it came to sentencing the defendants, each one was allowed to make a statement to the 
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court prior to the Judge’s decision, and one statement in particular, is important for the 
following discussion regarding interruptions; Jerry Rubin offered the Judge a copy of his 
book inscribed with the following: “Julius, you radicalized more young people than we 
ever could.’’84
The question of the value of the interruption in a courtroom setting becomes impor-
tant, since it is clear that the legal process cannot sustain itself when interrupted to the 
extent Judge Hoffman experienced in the case of the Chicago Seven. So what is an inter-
ruption, and what value does it hold? The interruption can be thought of as an act of 
deterritorialization, or a line of flight that transforms the multiplicity from which it origi-
nates, and connects it to another, as Deleuze and Guattari explain: ‘‘Multiplicities are 
defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization 
according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities.’’85 
Simply put, the moment where an interruption to any given process occurs can realign 
this process, or bring it into connection with another. Unless, that is, the process is not 
rearranged as a result of that which generates the line of flight, as Deleuze and Guattari 
go on to explain: ‘‘The line of flight marks: the reality of a finite number of dimensions 
that the multiplicity effectively fills; the impossibility of a supplementary dimension, 
unless the multiplicity is transformed by the line of flight …’’86 The potential for the 
courtroom to rearrange itself, to transcend its actuality and ascend its Body without 
Organs (as is suggested in the opening sections of this text) depends on its ability to 
move with an interruption, or rather, to follow the line of flight that emerges as a result 
of it. In instances such as the Chicago Seven, the horizon of the courtroom process, the 
seeming impossibility of any change in the process or the space, becomes apparent with 
each interruption and the cry of Judge Hoffman to return the room to order. Each return-
ing to order brings disorder back to the room, brings another interruption that interrupts 
only to be forcibly returned to the process – you radicalized us.
The way in which to capitalize on the value of the interruption is to sustain it, but also 
to make it sustainable, such that it becomes the process, so that it no longer interrupts. In 
such a way, the interruption becomes slow enough, subtle enough to evade the collapse 
of the process, to trick it into realignment. With this in mind, it is hoped that this mixed 
reading of the courtroom through Artaud and Deleuze becomes-imperceptible – a sus-
tainable interruption. The beauty of this interruption is that it does not.
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